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Reinventing Bakke
Alan J. Meese
 
acial preferences are under attack,
and preferences employed in higher
education are no exception. The
People  of California have declared such
preferences illegal as a matter of state law, in-
cluding those employed in college hiring and
admissions. One federal court has found that
non-remedial preferences in the hiring of high
school faculty violate Title VII.1 Another has
found non-remedial preferences in law school
admissions to be unconstitutional,2 and a
1 Taxman v. Board of Education of Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
2 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
third has found race-based scholarships
similarly void.3
If racial preferences in education have a
citadel, it is Regents of California v. Bakke.4
According to the proponents of preferences,
Bakke stands for the proposition that universi-
ties may employ racial preferences for the
purpose of enhancing the “diversity” of a
school’s student body.5 Moreover, many have
gone further, arguing that Bakke legitimates
preferences in hiring for the purpose of ensur-
3 Podberesky v. University of Maryland, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
4 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5 See OÓce of Legal Counsel, Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 19 U.S. Op. O.L.C. No. ___, 1995 WL 835775, at 10-11 ( June 28,
1995) (hereinafter OLC Opinion) (treating Justice Powell’s approval of preferences as “controlling”);
Laurence H. Tribe et al., Petition For Certiorari In Texas v. Hopwood, No. 95-1773, 12-15; Non-
Discrimination In Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756,
8760-62 (Feb. 23, 1994); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1529 (2d ed. 1988).
Indeed, twenty-nine distinguished constitutional scholars have characterized Justice Powell’s
opinion as binding authority. See Scholars’ Reply To Professor Fried, 99 Yale L.J. 163, 164, 166 (1989).
Alan J. Meese is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William
and Mary. He received his J.D from the University of Chicago, and his A.B. from the College of William and
Mary. Neal Devins provided helpful comments on earlier drafts.
R
Summer 98.book : Meese.fm  Page 381  Wednesday, August 12, 1998  10:27 PM
Alan J. Meese
382
 
1 G r e e n  B a g  2 d  3 8 1
ing a diverse workforce.6 Decisions invalidat-
ing preferences, these advocates say, are
inconsistent with Bakke.7
This essay argues that Bakke cannot bear
the weight that has been placed on it by propo-
nents of racial preferences. As an initial matter,
the language of Justice Powell’s controlling
opinion approving of preferences, which so
many have invoked, is dicta, the functional
equivalent of an advisory opinion. Not sur-
prisingly, this dicta rested upon certain crucial,
untested assumptions, assumptions that have
not been borne out since the decision. Thus,
the question whether diversity really is a
compelling state interest that will justify the
sort of race-conscious admissions policies
many universities are pursuing is still open to
consideration by the courts and political
branches.
N
It was, until recently, well settled as a matter of
Constitutional Law that public institutions of
higher learning may employ “benign” racial
preferences in admissions.8 The sole authority
for this proposition was Bakke v. Regents of Cal-
ifornia, the only case in which the Supreme
Court has considered such preferences.
Although Bakke failed to produce a majority
opinion, preference proponents have found
6 OLC Opinion, 1995 WL 835775, at 10, n.30 (suggesting that rationale of Bakke “may carry over to the
selection of university faculty”).
7 See Tribe, Petition For Certiorari In Hopwood, at 13; Brief Amicus Curiae For The United States In
Texas v. Hopwood, 12-13 (“Bakke’s landmark holding has guided admissions policies of public and
private institutions of higher education.”).
8 Tribe, American Constitutional Law, at 1529; John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term –
Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 10, n.33 (1978).
the holding of the case lodged in Justice
Powell’s opinion, which no other Justice
signed, announcing the judgment of the
Court. This opinion, these advocates say,
was the narrowest ground supporting the
judgment of the Court, and thus constitutes
its holding.9
What, then was this holding? As propo-
nents of preferences tell the story, Justice
Powell’s opinion “held” that, although a school
cannot employ quotas in admissions, it can
take race into account under a so-called “plus”
system of the sort that was then in place at
Harvard University.10 Under such a system,
schools may give credit to an applicant because
of his or her race, so long as such a practice is
part of a larger scheme in which applicants are
given credit for attributes – socio-economic or
geographic background and the like – of the
sort that can diversify a student body. 
Certainly Justice Powell’s opinion said all of
this, and more. The opinion “reversed” the
(purported) judgment of the California
Supreme Court that schools could not take
race into account in admissions. Indeed, the
Justice explicitly endorsed the sort of plus
system that was in place at Harvard, even
appending to his opinion a copy of Harvard’s
aÓrmative action plan. Achievement of a
“diverse” student body, he said, was a compel-
ling interest that justiÕed the consideration of
9 See OLC Opinion, 1995 WL 835775, at 10-11; Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev.
at 10, n.33; cf. United States v. Marks, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977). Unless otherwise noted, all citations
of Bakke are to Justice Powell’s separate opinion.
10 See Nondiscrimination In Federally-Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8760-62; Tribe, Constitutional
Law, at 1529; Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. at 10, n.33. Indeed, even
conÕrmed opponents of preferences treat Justice Powell’s opinion as the controlling authority on
this issue. See Lino Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas, Racial Preferences In Higher Education Upheld And
Endorsed, 45 J. Leg. Ed. 79, 86-87 (1995).
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race in the admissions process. So long as the
implementation of such plans involved the
individualized consideration of each applicant,
and the various attributes – racial and non-
racial – that rendered an applicant “diverse,”
they served a compelling state interest.11
Everything a court says, however, is not a
holding – even in cases as monumental as
Bakke. And, even cursory consideration
suggests that Justice Powell’s approval of a plus
system was not a holding, despite his “reversal”
of the California Supreme Court. The plan at
issue in Bakke, it must be recalled, was not a
plus system, but instead a straight-forward
quota plan. Under this plan, the medical
school at the University of California at Davis
reserved sixteen slots in the entering class for
minority applicants, individuals whose appli-
cations were not compared with those of non-
minorities. In this posture, then, the language
in Justice Powell’s opinion “aÓrming” the
judgment of the California Supreme Court
that quotas are unconstitutional was certainly
a holding. The language approving the use of a
plus system, however, was plainly gratuitous,
dealing, as it did, with an issue – and an
admissions program – that was not before the
Court. This language was dicta under the
conventional deÕnition.12
Justice Powell was quite aware that discus-
sion of a plus system was not necessary to the
disposition of the case before him. According
to his biographer, he initially planned to vote
simply to aÓrm the California Supreme
11 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-18.
12 See Black’s Law Dictionary, 454 (6th ed. 1990) (deÕning dictum as “[s]tatements and comments
in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential
to determination of the case in hand”). For a detailed analysis concluding that this language was
dicta, see Arval A. Morris, The Bakke Decision: One Holding Or Two, 58 Or. L. Rev. 311, 326-32 (1979). I
have drawn upon this article in constructing portions of my argument.
Court’s judgment voiding the Davis quota
plan, leaving for another day the question
whether other forms of racial preference might
survive scrutiny.13 Moreover, in a footnote, his
Õnal opinion responded directly to the asser-
tion by Justice Stevens that “the question
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an
admissions decision is not an issue in this
case.”14 According to Justice Powell, it was
appropriate to speak broadly for two related
reasons: Õrst, the trial court had denied Davis’
motion for a declaration that its plan was
lawful, and second, the California Supreme
Court had found the Davis plan unconstitu-
tional because it employed race as a factor in
admissions – not simply because it employed a
quota.15
A consideration of Justice Powell’s (legal)
justiÕcation for speaking broadly only
conÕrms that, in fact, language approving a
plus system was dicta. To be sure, the state had
sought a declaration that its admissions policy
was lawful. Yet, this claim was simply the
mirror image of Allan Bakke’s claim that the
scheme was unlawful; it is not clear how the
trial court’s denial of the state’s motion some-
how placed the legality of a plus system in
issue. Moreover, although the California
Supreme Court had stated that any use of race
was unconstitutional, it aÓrmed only that
portion of the trial court’s opinion declaring
the plan before it to be invalid, leaving for
another day the broader question whether the
school could employrace in another manner.16
13 See John C. JeÖries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 486-87 (1994).
14 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 271, n.†.
15 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271, n.†.
16 See Morris, One Holding Or Two, 58 Or. L. Rev. at 329-31. It should be noted that, initially, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court remanded the case with orders that Bakke be considered for admission with-
out regard to his race. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280. This judgment,  it seems, extended beyond mere
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The Supreme Court reviews only judgments,
not statements in opinions, and the judgment
of the California Supreme Court simply
declared Davis’ admissions policy unlawful.17
The analysis thus far may seem hypertech-
nical – even formalistic! What, however, about
the functional reasons for distinguishing dicta
from holding? There is, it seems, no better
statement of the policy distinguishing dicta
from holding than that oÖered by Chief
Justice Marshall.
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in conjunction with the case in which
those expressions are used. If they go beyond
the case, they may be respected, but ought not
to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision.
The reason of this maxim is obvious. The
question actually before the Court is investi-
gated with care, and considered in its full
extent. Other principles, which may serve to
illustrate it, are considered in their relation to
the case decided, but their possible bearing on
all other cases is seldom completely investi-
gated.18
Was the question whether a school could em-
ploy a plus system “investigated with care, and
considered in its full extent?” Justice Powell
thought so. After all, the question whether
17 See Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2582 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in the denial
of certiorari); California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307 (1987).
18 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821).
public universities could employ race in
admissions had been thoroughly briefed and
argued, Õrst in DeFunis v. Odegaard19 – where
the Court had ducked the issue – and then in
Bakke itself. Indeed, according to his biogra-
pher, Justice Powell believed that the Court
was as informed as it could be on the role of
race in college admissions, with the result that
failure to address the question broadly would
subject it to charges of dereliction of duty.20
To be sure, the Justices who heard Bakke had
been bombarded with briefs concerning the
permissibility vel non of race-conscious admis-
sions. Still, the Court lacked signiÕcant infor-
mation about the sort of system that Justice
Powell approved. There was no factual record
developed at trial about how a plus system or
its various possible variants actually operated –
Davis, after all, was operating a quota system.
Further, there was no consideration of such a
plan in the opinion of the California Supreme
Court. Indeed, even in its brief in the Supreme
Court, Davis did not defend a plus system.
Instead, it was left to several elite private
schools to describe such a plan in a brief am-
icus curiae. That brief, it should be noted, did
not ask the Court to distinguish between a
quota system and a plus system, but, instead, to
approve both systems.21
19 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
20 JeÖries, Justice Lewis Powell, at 489.
21 See Brief Of Amici Curiae Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University and the
University Of Pennsylvania, 2, n.1 (“[W]e seek in this brief to preserve the substantial independence
of our faculties, including the freedom to adopt admissions policies diÖerent from those we here
defend.”); id. at 27, n.18 (arguing that Davis quotas were constitutional).
disapproval of Davis’ quota system. But see Morris, One Holding Or Two, 58 Or. L. Rev. at 330 (argu-
ing that this initial judgment did not preclude any consideration of race). However, in its petition for
rehearing, the State conceded that Bakke would have been admitted absent its race-conscious admis-
sions program, and the California Supreme Court amended its opinion simply to order Bakke
admitted. See Bakke, 438 U.S at 280-81. Thus, even if the remand order precluded any use of race, it
was extinguished by the amended judgment from which the State petitioned. See Morris, One
Holding Or Two, 58 Or. L. Rev. at 330-31; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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The mere fact that citizens are interested in
an abstract question – and thus willing to Õle
amicus briefs on the subject – is not suÓcient
to confer on the Court the authority or ability
to resolve the issue. Instead, Article III’s case
or controversy requirement is designed to
ensure “that the legal questions presented to
the court will be resolved, not in the rariÕed
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realis-
tic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action.”22 Of course, there was a live contro-
versy before the Bakke Court: the respondent
had been excluded from medical school by a
racial quota, which the State sought to defend.
Still, the policies animating the case or contro-
versy requirement compelled Justice Powell to
conÕne himself to resolution of that actual,
concrete issue; any language broader than
necessary to do so should have no precedential
value should the Court decide to revisit the
question.23
Even before the question reaches the High
Court, however, lower courts and the political
22 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982); United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (“[Advisory] opinions, such advance expres-
sions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not pressed before the
Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and neces-
sary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multi-faced situation
embracing conÔicting and demanding interests, we have consistently refused to give.”).
23 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1997, 2000-2001 (1994) (arguing that
distinction between dicta and holding reÔects Article III’s concern that issues be resolved only after
careful consideration); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572-73 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring). See also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, n.7 (1984)
(Powell, J.) (refusing to consider argument raised by amici because “neither party before this Court
presses the argument”).
branches will be forced to answer it for them-
selves.24 Certainly these actors owe some
deference to Supreme Court dicta that is recent
and carefully considered.25 There is little
reason for these actors to accord Bakke’s dicta
such deference, though. By issuing what was in
essence an advisory opinion on the propriety of
a plus system, Justice Powell bypassed the
process of litigation that ordinarily precedes
constitutional decisionmaking, depriving him-
self and his brethren of important information
about the contours and operation of such a sys-
tem.26 For, as noted earlier, the only informa-
tion about a plus system before Justice Powell
was a three page statement found in the appen-
dix to the amicus brief that described how
Harvard University purportedly conducted its
admissions program. There was no factual
Õnding that the Harvard system actually oper-
ated in the manner described, or that other
systems operated in a similar manner. Nor did
Justice Powell cite any decisions in lower
courts addressing the operation of plus sys-
tems. Still, in drawing the pivotal distinction
24 This duty, it should be noted, may well extend to universities themselves. See Alleghany Corp. v.
Hasse, 896 F.2d 1046, 1053-56 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
25 Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994); but compare Covino v. Reopel, 89 F.3d
105, 109 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to follow recent Supreme Court dicta).
26 “[A]dvisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere. The impact of actuality and
intensities of immediacy are wanting. In the attitude of court and counsel, in the vigor of adequate
representation of the facts behind legislation (lamentably inadequate even in contested litigation)
there is thus a wide gulf of diÖerence, partly rooted in psychological factors, between opinions in
advance of legislation and decisions in litigation after such proposals are embodied into law.
Advisory opinions are rendered upon sterilized and mutilated records.” Felix Frankfurter, A Note On
Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1005-1006 (1924). 
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between a plus and a quota plan, Justice Powell
made certain critical assumptions. Perhaps
most importantly, he assumed – again without
any factual Õndings – that schools really did
consider all forms of diversity, and not simply
racial diversity, a compelling educational objec-
tive. Moreover, he assumed that academics –
most of whom have no training in constitu-
tional law – could and would comprehend and
implement the framework premised upon this
belief.27 Finally, and relatedly, he assumed that
they would implement a system purportedly
designed to further diversity across the board
without using it “as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system.”28 How schools
would do this, and how courts could tell, was
not addressed.29 Dicta built on such Ôimsy
foundations should not deter other actors
from making independent judgments on the
question.
N
Constitutional cases do not exist in a vacuum,
but are instead shaped by the responses of
political actors.30 Bakke was no exception.
Despite the argument, explicitly made by
Justice Stevens, that Justice Powell’s opinion
went further than warranted by the contro-
versy before the Court, the academy and the
27 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (“A boundary line … is none the worse for being narrow.”).
28 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
29 Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Disease As Cure: In Order To Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account Of
Race, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 148 (arguing that courts would not be able to determine whether
schools are pursuing diversity consistently).
30 See Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values, 23-40 (1996).
political branches immediately spun Bakke
into a “holding” that non-quota preferences in
admissions were permissible.31 In evaluating
the legality of their plans, schools had little to
go on, except Justice Powell’s statement that a
school could not place a hard and fast ceiling
on non-minority admits, that it had to provide
“individualized consideration” to applicants,
and that it could consider race only as one
of many factors bearing on an applicant’s
diversity.
Litigation that has occurred since Bakke,
however, suggests that at least some schools
have failed to follow even the principles
Justice Powell made relatively clear, and that
some of the assumptions the Justice made
may not have involved “a realistic appreciation
of the consequences of judicial action.”
Under the aegis of Bakke, the law schools
at both Berkeley and the University of
Texas adopted preference plans that (1) set
numerical “goals” for the admission of various
minority groups, (2) reviewed minority
applications separately from those of non-
minorities, and (3) kept segregated waiting
lists.32 Moreover, each school was apparently
engaged in reverse engineering, varying the
size of the “plus” or making other adjustments
mid-way through the admissions process,
when it appeared that “goals” would not be
31 Nondiscrimination In Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Policy
Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58510 (Oct. 2, 1979) (“The [Bakke] Court aÓrmed the legality of
voluntary aÓrmative action.”); Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. at 10, n.33.
One counter-example is Professor Morris’ article: One Holding Or Two, 58 Or. L. Rev. at 326-332. The
academy does not seem particularly interested in Professor Morris’ argument. A Lexis search located
two citations of this article, neither of which mentions the assertion that Justice Powell’s approval of
a plus system was dicta.
32 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38; Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Regional Civil Rights Director OÓce
For Civil Rights, United States Department of Education, to Dr. Chang-Lin Tien, at 2-4 (Septem-
ber 25, 1992) (hereinafter Jackson Letter).
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met.33 There were apparently no goals, sepa-
rate consideration, separate waiting lists, or
mid-course adjustments for applicants of
modest means, student leaders, or others
diverse for reasons unrelated to their race.34
Given their narrow focus on racial diversity
simpliciter, it seems doubtful that these
schools could have demonstrated that pursuit
of “diversity” was truly a compelling state
interest, as Justice Powell understood that
term.35 Moreover, these plans, even if they
had pursued diversity consistently, seemed to
oÖend Justice Powell’s requirement that
applicants be accorded individualized
treatment.36 If faculties at some of the best
law schools in the country cannot compre-
hend and apply the distinction between a
quota system and a plus system, it is not clear
how we can expect everyone else to do so.37
The inability of universities to understand
and apply Bakke may stem not so much from a
33 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936, n.6; Jackson Letter, at 3.
34 See Jackson Letter, at 2 (“Only the applicant’s race or ethnicity is closely monitored and evaluated
with reference to percentage targets. No benchmarks have been established with respect to consid-
eration of the remaining factors.”).
35 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 546-47 (holding that an interest that is not consis-
tently pursued cannot be deemed “compelling”); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
793 (1978) (Powell, J.) (same). Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualiÕcations and characteristics of which racial or
ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”).
36 See Jackson Letter, at 4-5. Even the Clinton Administration concluded that the Texas plan was in-
consistent with Justice Powell’s dicta. See Brief For The United States In Hopwood, at 14, n.13. 
37 These cases do not appear to be isolated instances. In Hopwood, for instance, the Deans at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina, the University of Minnesota, and Stanford Law School all submitted
testimony in support of the Texas plan. See 861 F. Supp. 551, 576, n.72 (W.D. Tex. 1994). According
to the district court, the Minnesota system “use[d] mechanisms in the admissions procedure similar
in function to those used by [the University of Texas] law school.” Id. Similarly, the court concluded
that, prior to a settlement with the OÓce of Civil Rights, Stanford “use[d] a system comparable to
that used by [Texas]” under which one individual, instead of a committee, examined only minority
applications. Id. Stanford, of course, is not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, however,
bound by federal statutory law, which forbids racial discrimination by universities that receive fed-
eral funding. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284-87 (Õnding that requirements of Title VI and the Constitu-
tion are coextensive).
lack of understanding, as from a lack of will.
There is strong support for racial preferences
in the academy, and one suspects that many
institutions, at least, are not overly concerned
with the niceties of how, exactly, such pro-
grams are administered.38 Still, if schools are
circumventing Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion,
that opinion must bear some of the blame.
For, the Justice was decidedly vague about just
how a plus system could be operated. This
vagueness can be traced directly to the absence
of any actual controversy over the constitu-
tionality of a plus system, and the insistence by
Justice Powell upon reaching a question that
had not yet “percolated” in the lower courts. In
the face of such strong support in the academy
for preferences, anything but a clear, factually
anchored opinion was destined to fail.39
One could argue that, at least from today’s
vantage point, any objection to Justice Powell’s
overreaching is moot. For, there now seems to
38 Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. at 10, n.33 (referring to the distinction
between quotas and a plus system as “cosmetic”).
39 For an argument that this problem characterizes the Court’s aÓrmative action jurisprudence
generally, see Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors v. Peña and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme
Court AfÕrmative Action Decisions, 37 W. & M. L. Rev. 673 (1996). 
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be general consensus that separate admissions
committees of the sort employed at Texas and
Berkeley are unlawful. One might therefore
conclude that schools are, with this supple-
mentary guidance, capable of operating a plus
system in a manner that does not devolve into
a quota, thus lending (admittedly tardy)
support to Justice Powell’s assumption to this
effect and suggesting that lower courts and
others should treat Justice Powell’s Bakke
opinion as a holding.40
Still, the mere elimination of separate com-
mittees cannot, ipso facto, give schools a blank
check to employ racial preferences. There is
still the separate question whether racial
preferences, in whatever form, serve a compel-
ling state interest. In “holding” that they did,
Justice Powell assumed that schools would
consider race along with other factors that
might render an applicant “diverse.” Indeed,
such an even-handed consideration of all such
factors is a necessary, albeit not suÓcient,
condition for a Õnding that racial preferences
serve a compelling state interest.41 Thus, even
if universities are employing a unitary
admissions process, whether diversity really
can be a compelling state interest is still,
despite Justice Powell’s dicta, unresolved,
awaiting actual controversies, Õrst in the lower
40 Some might also argue that “reliance” upon Justice Powell’s dicta should justify adherence to it, even
by the Supreme Court. See Tribe, Petition For Certiorari In Hopwood, at 13. It is hard to say, however,
that schools that had adopted separate admissions committees, for instance, really did “rely” on
Justice Powell’s dicta in any meaningful sense. At any rate, it seems doubtful that reliance by the state
constitutes the sort of reliance that requires adherence to a decision. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 856 (1993). Finally, allowing institutions – particularly institutions that coordinate
their behavior through trade associations – to transmute dicta into a holding by means of “reliance”
will create dangerous incentives.
41 See n.35, supra (collecting cases holding that an interest cannot be deemed compelling if it is not
pursued consistently).
courts and then, presumably, in the Supreme
Court itself.
N
Let us assume, however, that schools can
demonstrate that diversity is an interest that
they are pursuing consistently. The question
still remains whether, as Justice Powell
assumed, schools can be trusted to pursue that
interest without adopting the functional
equivalent of a quota system. For, even if all
applicants are considered by a single commit-
tee that considers multiple diversity factors, a
cunning school can, based on experience and
foresight, set the size of the plus to assure that
the entering class has a certain percentage of
minorities. Indeed, the Dean at Berkeley
conÕdently predicted that the elimination of
separate admissions committees, numerical
targets, and segregated waiting lists would not
aÖect the proportion of minorities matriculat-
ing there.42 
If, in fact, it is possible to achieve racial
targets simply by adjusting the size of the plus,
the distinction between quotas and a plus sys-
tem seems well nigh illusory. This realization,
of course, could cut in diÖerent directions. To
opponents of preferences, it simply conÕrms
42 See San Francisco Chronicle, a1 (September 29, 1992) (quoting Dean Herma Hill Kay);
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948, n.36 (“In this case, the law school appeared to be especially adept at meet-
ing its yearly ‘goals.’”). See also Bernard Schwartz, Beyond Bakke: Affirmative Action And The
Supreme Court, 155 (1988) (claiming that “virtually all” universities set the size of the plus so as to
“secure roughly the same percentage of minority students each year”). This is not to say that such
reverse engineering of the size of the plus will be as eÖective at assuring proportional representation
as an outright quota. Schools should Õnd little solace, however, in the fact that they are merely
attempting to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
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that a plus system inevitably devolves into a
quota system, with all the evils Justice Powell
identiÕed; to proponents, it reemphasizes that
something very much like a quota is necessary
to serve the compelling state interest of diver-
sity. As courts reconsider the validity of racial
preferences it will all boil down, it seems, to
whether or not race can ever be a factor in the
admissions process, not how it is used.
The equation of a plus system with a quota
system does not, however, follow ineluctably
from the conclusion that the consideration of
race can constitute a compelling state interest.
The apparent inevitability of equating a plus
system with quotas depends upon a particular
method of reading Justice Powell’s (admittedly
ambiguous) dicta about what a constitutional
preference system would look like. More
precisely, the current state of aÖairs seems
premised upon a view that “diversity” is an
attribute possessed by, say, an entering class,
viewed as a whole, instead of an attribute pos-
sessed by individual members of that class.
That these two approaches are quite diÖerent
is conÕrmed by the diÖerent manner in which
they would be implemented. Under the former
approach, the size of the plus would be set so as
to assure, to the extent possible, that a certain
proportion of minorities, student leaders, and
other diverse applicants are admitted. Under
the latter, the size of the plus would be deter-
mined, behind a veil of ignorance, based upon
a judgement about the value of the characteris-
tic in question to the educational atmosphere
that an institution hopes to foster. Application
of this sort of plus system may or may not
produce diverse classes, depending upon the
size of the plus and relative academic qualiÕca-
tions of applicants who are not “diverse,” or are
diverse for reasons unrelated to race.
Proponents of preferences might argue that
these two methods of taking race into account
are not mutually exclusive. After all, the value
of a certain attribute to the community might
depend upon the presence of other students
who possess the same attribute. Minorities,
for instance, might feel a sense of isolation if
there are not a suÓcient number of fellow
minorities in their class, a factor that cannot
be taken into account from behind the veil of
ignorance. Perhaps Justice Powell was refer-
ring to this phenomenon when he noted that
the size of the plus might change year to year
“depending upon the ‘mix’ both of the student
body and applicants for incoming classes.”43 
One can grant, arguendo, that the value of a
particular individual’s attributes might depend
upon the presence or absence of other stu-
dents sharing the same attribute, though
again, this assumption was not tested in the
crucible of the adversarial process in Bakke.
Such a conclusion, however, would not require
lower courts to approve the use of a plus
system to achieve numerical goals. After all,
similar reasoning would seem to require the
setting of targets not simply for those who are
racially diverse, but also for those who possess
other diversity characteristics as well, some-
thing universities likely do not do, thus under-
mining any claim that targets are aimed at
“diversity.”44 Moreover, there is no reason why
schools should set targets, as they apparently
have, based upon, say, the proportion of
minorities appearing in the population, or
some subset of it.45 Instead, such a plus
should be set with reference to that propor-
43 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-318. See also Harvard College Admissions Program, reprinted in Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 323 (“there is some relationship between numbers and achieving the beneÕts to be derived from a
diverse student body”).
44 Students of modest means or Evangelical Christians, for instance, may feel isolated if not in the
presence of many similar students. 
45 See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560, and n.19 (Õnding that the law school set its “goals” for admission of
minorities based upon “the percentage of minority college graduates” in Texas). Some states appar-
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tion of minorities that is necessary to elimi-
nate feelings of isolation, a percentage which
should bear no logical relationship to the pro-
portion of minorities in the state in which an
institution happens to reside. Programs that
insist instead upon some form of proportional
representation would not be narrowly tailored.
Thus, even if courts should determine that
diversity is a compelling state interest, the
choice between competing definitions of
diversity will significantly shape the contours
of permissible racial preference programs.
N
Justice Powell’s conclusion that colleges and
universities may employ a race-conscious
system of admissions was a quintessential
advisory opinion, an opinion that rested upon
several untested assumptions. Lower courts
and others, then, should feel free to reach their
own conclusions about the propriety of
employing racial preferences in the admission
process. In so doing, they will have occasion to
test directly the assumptions Justice Powell
made by examining closely the manner in
which “plus systems” are operated. In so
doing, they may see something Justice Powell
missed. B
ently require their universities to employ similar benchmarks. See Maryland Educ. Code Ann.
§ 12-107(a)(3) (1996) (requiring universities “to assure that women and minorities are equitably
represented among the student body … so that the University reÔects the diversity of the State’s
population.”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10a-11 (1996) (directing state’s Board of Governors of Higher
Education “to ensure … that students … at each institution are representative of the racial and
ethnic diversity of the total population of the state”).
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